U.S. Bombs Iran’s Nuclear Sites Despite IAEA Saying No Weapons Found

Swift Ratel

— 3 min read
U.S. Bombs Iran’s Nuclear Sites Despite IAEA Saying No Weapons Found
Source: Facebook

The night the bombs fell on Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan, the world saw the United States—under Donald Trump’s orders—cross a line that international law and nuclear diplomacy had drawn decades ago. The official rationale was the same old refrain: Iran’s nuclear program posed an imminent threat. But the facts, as confirmed by the world’s nuclear watchdog and codified in international treaties, tell a different story—one where law, science, and truth were casualties of politics.

Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Iran, like every signatory, is explicitly entitled to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. Article IV of the NPT is unambiguous: nations have the right to develop, research, and use nuclear energy for civilian ends, including medical isotope production, provided these activities are under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. This legal framework is the backbone of the global non-proliferation regime, balancing the prevention of nuclear weapons spread with the right to peaceful nuclear technology.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, for its part, has been consistent and clear. Rafael Grossi, the IAEA’s Director General, stated on June 18, 2025: “What we reported was that we did not have any proof of a systematic effort [by Iran] to move toward a nuclear weapon." In his official briefings to the UN Security Council, Grossi reiterated that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles remained under safeguards, and that the agency had “no indication Iran is operating a systematic program to produce a nuclear weapon." While Iran’s enrichment had reached up to 60% U-235—a level below weapons-grade—there was no evidence of diversion to a weapons program.

International law is not ambiguous about the use of force against nuclear facilities. Article 56 of the Geneva Conventions prohibits military attacks on nuclear installations unless they are being used for direct and regular military support, and even then, only as a last resort. The NPT further enshrines the right to peaceful nuclear activity, so long as it is monitored and not diverted to weapons. The U.S. strikes, absent any evidence of weaponization or imminent threat, were a violation of both humanitarian and non-proliferation law.

The destruction of Fordow and Natanz did more than set back Iran’s nuclear program. It obliterated infrastructure for medical isotope production—lifesaving technology for cancer patients and diagnostic medicine—while risking radiological disaster for civilians. Grossi warned the Security Council that further damage to Iranian nuclear facilities could result in radiological leaks endangering surrounding populations, and that any strike on a reactor like Bushehr could cause a “very high” release of radioactivity into the environment.

By bypassing the IAEA and the NPT’s dispute mechanisms, the United States sent a message: treaties are for the weak, verification means nothing if it gets in the way of a good airstrike, and international law is subordinate to the politics of fear. The precedent is chilling. If the world’s leading nuclear power can unilaterally bomb safeguarded facilities—while inspectors confirm no weapons program exists—what’s left of the non-proliferation regime?

Trump’s declaration of victory, broadcast to millions, was less a triumph than a confession. The United States had acted without legal right, in defiance of the very treaties it helped write, and in the face of clear evidence from the world’s nuclear watchdog that Iran’s program was not a threat. The world is now less safe, the NPT weaker, and the rule of law diminished. The facts, as always, are stubborn things—and no amount of political theater can erase them.

Geopolitical Perspective Questions

  1. In what ways could continued Israeli and U.S. military actions against Iranian nuclear sites provoke a regional escalation or even a broader conflict?
  2. What risks do attacks on nuclear facilities pose to civilian populations and the environment?
  3. How does the IAEA’s verification regime function in a context where major powers dispute its findings or use them selectively to justify military action?

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